R. v. Hodgson (2024 SCC 25): Chokeholds, Self-Defence, and Appeals of Acquittals
The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in R. v. Hodgson (2024 SCC 25) provides valuable clarification on common issues in Canadian law. Most notably, prosecutors’ common claims that chokeholds are inherently dangerous are no longer accepted at face value. The use of chokeholds must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, as there is “no legal rule as to the general dangerousness of chokeholds.”
The Supreme Court also reminded appellate courts that overturning an acquittal is not done lightly and only in limited circumstances where the judge’s error was in law, not in fact. Findings of fact are not open for an appellate court to reweigh or replace. If and when an appellate court does find an error of law, it must articulate it with precision and clarity. An appellate court must also be reasonably certain that, if the error had not been made, the acquittal would not have occurred.
Background of the Case
Facts of the Incident
Daniel Hodgson attended a house party where he was asked to help remove Bradley Winsor, an intoxicated guest who refused to leave. During the altercation, Hodgson used a chokehold to restrain Winsor, who lost consciousness and died despite resuscitation attempts.
Trial and Initial Acquittal
The trial judge acquitted Hodgson of second-degree murder and manslaughter, finding that the Crown failed to establish the requisite subjective intent (mens rea) for murder. The judge also concluded that Hodgson’s use of the chokehold in self-defence was reasonable in the circumstances.
Legal Issues and Supreme Court Ruling
Subjective Intent for Murder
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that there is no universal rule deeming chokeholds as inherently dangerous acts. The dangerousness of a chokehold must be assessed based on the specific facts of each case, including its nature, force, and duration. Importantly, the Court highlighted that subjective foresight is required for a murder conviction, focusing solely on what the accused intended, not what they should have known about the chokehold’s dangers.
Application to Hodgson’s Case
The trial judge accepted Hodgson’s testimony that he did not believe the chokehold was inherently dangerous and did not intend to kill Winsor. This subjective assessment led to Hodgson’s acquittal for murder. The Supreme Court upheld this approach, emphasizing that an objective standard (what a reasonable person should know) should not be used to determine mens rea for murder.
Self-Defence Analysis
The Supreme Court also addressed the self-defence claim under section 34 of the Criminal Code, which involves both subjective and objective components:
- Subjective Belief: The accused must subjectively believe that force or a threat thereof was being used against them or another person.
- Objective Reasonableness: This belief must be reasonable in the circumstances, assessed through the lens of what a reasonable person with the accused’s characteristics would perceive.
Trial Judge’s Correct Application
The trial judge applied the correct legal framework for self-defence, considering the relevant factors outlined in the Criminal Code. These included the nature and proportionality of Hodgson’s response, the threat posed by Winsor, and the context of the altercation. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial judge’s thorough and balanced assessment, which led to the conclusion that Hodgson’s use of the chokehold was reasonable in the circumstances.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Hodgson underscores the importance of evaluating the specific facts and subjective intent in cases involving chokeholds. It also clarifies the legal standards for self-defence, ensuring that both subjective beliefs and objective reasonableness are appropriately considered. This ruling provides valuable guidance for future cases, reinforcing the nuanced approach required in assessing self-defence claims in Canada.
Notable passages from the case
“A court’s jurisdiction to hear and address an appeal of an acquittal thus depends upon there being an error involving “a question of law alone.” – para 19
“Avoiding wrongful convictions is one rationale that explains why the scope of the accused’s right of appeal is wider than the Crown’s. As explained in Biniaris,“[e]rror-free trials are desirable as such, but even more so as a safeguard against wrongful convictions.” – para 27
“As explained in Cullen, “[a]t the foundation of criminal law lies the cardinal principle that no [individual] shall be placed in jeopardy twice for the same matter . . . . It is the supreme invasion of the rights of an individual to subject [that individual] by the physical power of the community to a test which may mean the loss of [their] liberty or [their] life; and there is a basic repugnance against the repeated exercise of that power on the same facts unless for strong reasons of public policy.” – para 30
“Even if the Crown is able to point to an error of law, acquittals are not overturned lightly … The Crown must also convince the appellate court, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that the verdict of acquittal would not necessarily have been the same had the error not occurred.” – para 36
“Given the circumscribed ambit of the Crown’s right of appeal from acquittals and the pressing policy considerations that underpin it, appellate courts should expressly identify the offending errors of law.” – para 39
“[A]ny slippage from the high bar of subjective intent required for murder must be avoided. The accused’s actions are not to be measured against the objective standard of a reasonable person in the same circumstances. The mens rea for murder requires more than an intention to cause bodily harm that the accused knew was dangerous; an accused must have intended to cause bodily harm that they knew was likely to cause death. Thus, the proposition that a chokehold is always an inherently dangerous act runs the risk of inappropriately injecting an objective element into the mens rea analysis for murder. This is because the subjective foresight required for murder is focused solely on what the accused intended, and the analysis cannot consider what the accused ought to have known about the inherent dangerousness of a chokehold.” – para 50
“[A]ccepting the proposition that a chokehold is always an inherently dangerous act in every case would inappropriately import an objective element into the analysis of the mens rea of murder. Accepting this proposition would also usurp the role of the trier of fact, who must assess the dangerousness of a chokehold based on the facts of the particular case.” – para 52
“With respect, the Court of Appeal seems to have simply disagreed with the trial judge’s assessment that the chokehold used in these circumstances was intended to be a regular “calm down” method. Such a disagreement as to the characterization of a chokehold in these particular circumstances is not an error of law that justifies overturning an acquittal.” – para 58
“Respectfully, Lemmon is being read too widely if taken to establish a general legal proposition that a chokehold is always an inherently dangerous act.” – para 60
